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Sequential Investments with Stage Specific Risks and Drifts 
Abstract 
We provide a generalized analytical methodology for evaluating a real sequential investment 
opportunity, which does not rely on a multivariate distribution function, but which allows for 
stage specific risks and drifts.  This model may be a useful capital budgeting and valuation tool 
for exploration and development projects, where risks change over the stages. We construct a 
stage threshold pattern whereby the final stage threshold exceeds the early stage threshold due to  
drift differentials between the project values at the various stages, value volatility differences, 
and correlation differentials, implying a rich menu of parameter values that may be suitable for a 
variety of projects.  Governments seeking to motivate early final stage investments might lower 
final stage project volatility or specify project value decline over time, unless prospective owners 
are willing to pay the real option value (ROV) for concessions.  In contrast, concession owners, 
more interested in ROV than thresholds that motivate early investments, may welcome final 
stage value escalation, or guarantees that reduce the correlation between project value and 
construction cost. 
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 Introduction 
We determine the project value thresholds that justify an investment at any stage for a project 
composed of multiple sequential investments, allowing for stage specific risks and drifts. This 
extends the Adkins and Paxson (2014) multi-factor model, which requires the project failure 
probabilities to decline at each stage approaching the final completion stage.  It also 
complements Cassimon et al. (2011), which allows for stage specific project volatilities but not 
for stage specific value drifts or for other uncertainties regarding project failure or investment 
cost risks and drifts.  Cassimon et al. (2011) builds on the Geske (1979) European compound 
option approach, so no thresholds are determined, and there is no flexibility in investment 
timing.   Our solution requires some package of positive drift or volatility or correlation 
differentials between the final stage and the initial stage, (if there is no probability of complete 
project failure), which is a characteristic of many exploration and development (E&D),  and 
infrastructure projects. 
 
Suppose  a real sequential investment opportunity consists of a set of distinct, ordered 
investments that have to be made before the project can be completed. The project can be 
interpreted as a collection of investment stages, such that no stage investment, except the first, 
can be started until the preceding stage has been completed. The project value is realized when 
all the stages have been successfully completed. The following four-stage E&D opportunity from 
Cortazar et al. (2003) provides an illustration: (i) undertaking geological research. (ii) drilling an 
exploratory well, (iii) drilling development wells and (iv) implementing the infrastructure for 
production.   
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Making an investment at any stage depends on whether the prevailing project value is of 
sufficient magnitude to economically justify making the stage investment. We are interested in 
the package of value and investment cost drifts, volatilities and correlations that result in a 
pattern of project value thresholds that justify making an immediate investment at each stage that 
increase as the stages near completion. Adkins and Paxson (2014) obtain this result through 
assuming that the investment opportunity at any stage is subject to a catastrophic failure that 
causes the option value to be entirely destroyed, so the project as an entity becomes irredeemably 
lost like in some R&D and venture capital activities. There are investment opportunities such as 
mineral leases where there is no doubt that the reservoir or relevant minerals exist but economic 
development depends on the prevailing commodity prices, and investment and operating costs.  
(Canadian tar sands are a primary example at low crude oil prices.) There are three sources of 
uncertainty, the stochastic project values and the stochastic investment costs, which are permitted 
to be correlated at each of the project stages. Because of value conservation, the option for any 
stage except completion is evaluated at the point where the investment required to continue is 
less than the value of the option created at the next stage. In this way, the sequential opportunity 
is a compound option specified over multiple stages. We formulate an analytical solution to a 
multiple compound option based on American perpetuities. 
 
One of the first attempts to obtaining a solution for sequential investments based on American 
perpetuity options is formulated by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). They suggest a rule for a two-
stage sequential investment with fixed investment costs, but their solution is seemingly 
implausible as it is identical to the one-stage result except for the accumulated costs.  This 
problem is noted by Rodrigues (2009), who uses differential segment demand volatilities, 
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investment costs, and some other measures, to evaluate optimal timing among segments, with 
thresholds increasing with time and investment, under an endogenous regime-switching process.  
Kort et al. (2010) propose that the American perpetuity option value for a two-stage sequential 
investments is equal to the sum of the separate option values, but this formulation suffers the 
defect of a lack of compoundedness in the sense that the first and second stage option values are 
independent. 
 
An alternative method for reaching a closed-form rule for sequential investment opportunities is 
to suspend the need for an elapse time between stages that is unknown and uncertain, and to 
replace it by one that is known and fixed. This relaxation converts the underlying option type 
from American to European.  Cassimon et al. (2011) extends the Cassimon et al. (2004) 
European compound model and illustrates that the ROV of a mobile payments project with value 
volatilities declining from 54% to 35% in four stages approaching completion is €20.14m, 
compared to €22.10m with a constant volatility of 54%1.  Of course, these European options are 
not investment timing models.  
 
Some authors eschew the reputed merits of closed-form European compound options and solve 
the sequential investment opportunity through the power of numerical techniques.   A trinomial 
lattice formulation is used by Childs and Triantis (1999) to solve a multiple sequential 
investment model having cash-flow interaction.  Schwartz and Moon (2000) provide a numerical 
solution for complex R&D options, with project failure that does not always decline as the 
                                                 
1
 They did not provide the stage specific ROVs, or (since European) the V thresholds that would justify making the 
required investments at each stage. 
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project approaches completion, but with constant asset volatility, drifts and investment cost 
volatility over four stages.  Cortazar et al. (2003) assume the probability of success increases as 
the E&D stages near completion (production) with investment costs almost always increasing 
near completion.  An implicit finite-difference numerical solution provides a value first without 
options, and then with operating, development and exploration options as a function of expected 
copper mine size. Cortelezzi and Villani (2009) use Monte Carlo simulation for valuing a R&D 
project characterized as an American sequential exchange option.  Koussis et al. (2013) provide 
numerical solutions for multi-stages with multiple options. The shortcomings of these solution 
methods are the possibly onerous and not always transparent calculations.  
 
The aim of this paper is to reformulate and solve analytically the sequential investment model by 
incorporating three distinct sources of stage specific uncertainties. The three sources are 
characterized by the uncertainty associated with the project value and the investment cost for 
each stage, and the correlation of value and cost. Based on an American perpetuity option 
framework, we find that the project value threshold that justifies investment at each stage is a 
recursive expression represented by a function of the investment cost threshold at the particular 
stage and those for all the subsequent stages. Further, we demonstrate that the option value for 
each stage is a homogenous degree-1 and convex function, in keeping with the Merton (1973) 
assertion. In contrast to Adkins and Paxson (2014), there is no requirement that the probability of 
catastrophic failure continually declines at each stages until completion. However, there are 
usually alternative requirements that, for instance, the expected project value (V) drift (as 
defined in EQ 1 or its risk neutral equivalent as in EQ 2) for the final stage exceeds that for the 
initial stage, or the stage one V1 volatility exceeds the stage two V2 volatility, or that the 
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correlation of V1 and investment cost (K1) is sufficiently lower than the V2,K1 correlation, and 
possibly other correlation differentials, which result in the threshold for the initial stage being 
lower than the final stage.  While various combinations of these requirements may not be present 
in all projects, this approach offers a richer menu and package of requirements than the simple 
Adkins and Paxson (2014) project failure pattern.  
 
The major analytical findings for this sequential investment model are developed in Section 2. 
Based on the three sources of uncertainty, the model is presented first for a one-stage 
opportunity, and then  developed for a two-stage sequential investment opportunity. We develop 
closed-form solutions for whether or not to commence investment at a particular stage and for 
the option value at each stage. In Section 3, we obtain further insights into the behavior of the 
model through numerical illustrations. The last section summarizes some advantages and 
limitations of this model and suggests plausible extensions. 
  
Sequential Investment Model 
 
A  monopolist  is considering an investment project made up of a two sequential stages, each 
involving an individual non-zero instantaneous investment cost. The project as an entity is not 
fully implemented and the project value not realized until  the two sequential stages have been 
successfully completed. Each successive investment stage relies on the successful completion of 
the investment made at the preceding stage.  We order each investment stage by the number J  
of remaining stages, including the current one, until project completion, so the final stage is stage 
1.  
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After an initial investment, there may be differences in expected project value drifts, volatilities, 
K drifts, volatilities and/or correlations, so that the thresholds that justify making any subsequent 
investments increase approaching completion. Generally this will be accompanied by an increase 
in the power parameter values nearing completion. It may be that these stage specific parameter 
values are due to the previous stage investments being made, or they may also be exogenous, 
perhaps due to the nature of the stage. Situations do arise when an investment can produce an 
innovative breakthrough and generate an unanticipated increase in the project value. We have 
ignored this possibility, but allow for an exogenous change in project value drift or volatility, 
possibly due to a change in or different segments of the term structure of forward commodity 
prices.  Also, other forms of optionality, such as terminating a project before completion for its 
abandonment value, are not considered. 
 
The value of the project is defined byV . This value cannot be realized until the ultimate 
investment at 1J   has been successfully completed. Both the project value and the set of 
investment expenditures are treated as stochastic. It is assumed that they are individually well 
described by the geometric Brownian motion process: 
 d d d
J J JX X X
X X t X z   , (1) 
for  ,J JX V K J  , where JX  represent the respective drift parameters for each stage, JX  
the respective instantaneous volatility parameter, and d
JX
z  the respective increment of a 
standard Wiener process. Dependence between any two of the factors is represented by the 
covariance term; so, for example, the covariance between the project value and the investment 
expenditure at stage J  is specified by: 
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  Cov d ,d d
J J J JJ J V K V K
V K t   . 
The project value and investment cost drift, volatility and correlation parameter values are 
permitted to vary by stage, but are assumed to remain constant during the stage. It is assumed 
that the investment expenditure at each stage is instantaneous with a zero time-to-build and that 
sufficient internally generated or external funds are available on time to meet the financing needs 
at each stage.  
1.1 One-Stage Model 
The stage-1 model represents the investment opportunity for developing a project value 1V  
following the investment cost 1K . We develop the solution based on the two-factor solution of  
Adkins and Paxson (2011), which is extendable to dimensions greater than two. The value 
1 1ROV F  of the investment opportunity at stage 1J   depends on the project value and the 
investment cost, so  1 1 1 1,F F V K . By Ito’s lemma, the risk neutral valuation relationship is: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2 2
2 2 2 21 1 11 1
1 1 1 12 22 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1
0
V K V K V K
V K
F F F
V K V K
V K V K
F F
V K rF ,
V K
  
      
   
 
     
 
 (2) 
where the 
JX
  for  ,J JX V K J  denote the respective risk neutral drift rate parameters
2
 and r 
the risk-free rate treated as constant over all stages. The generic solution to (2) is the two-factor 
power function: 
 1 11 1 1 1 ,F AV K
   (3) 
                                                 
2
 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for some theories relating the real world and risk-neutral drift.  We assume for 
convenience that  is not affected by changes in volatilities, or correlations. 
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where 1  and 1  denote the generic unknown parameters for the two factors, project value and 
investment cost, and 1A  denotes a generic unknown coefficient. In this notation, the first 
subscript for 1A , 1  and 1  refers to the specific stage under consideration, while the second 
subscript refers to the stage specific power parameter value where appropriate. We expect 
1 0A   
since the option value is positive. A justified economic incentive to exercise the stage-1 option 
exists whenever the project value is sufficiently high and the investment cost is sufficiently low, 
and this incentive intensifies for project value increases and investment cost decreases. The 
threshold levels for the project value and the investment cost signaling the optimal exercise for 
the investment option at stage 1J   are denoted by 
1Vˆ  and 1Kˆ , respectively. The value matching 
relationship describes the conservation equality at optimality that the option value 
 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ,F F V K  exactly compensates for the net asset value 1 1ˆ ˆV K  obtained by spending the 
investment cost. Then:  
    1 1
1 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆAV K V K    .                       (4) 
The first order condition for optimality is characterized by the two associated smooth pasting 
conditions, one for each factor, Samuelson (1965).  These can be expressed as: 
 1 1 11 1 1
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ VAV K 

 . (5) 
     1 1 11 1 1
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ KAV K 

              (6) 
Since the option value is always non-negative, 1 0A  , as expected. Together, (4,5,6) 
demonstrate Euler’s result on homogeneity degree-1 functions, so 1 1 1   . So the 
characteristic root equation satisfying (2) is: 
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        
1 1 1
21
1 1 1 1 1 1 12
1 1 0                
V K K
Q , r ,  (7) 
where 
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2
1
2        
V K V ,K V K
. From (7), 
1  is obtained as the positive root solution for 
the quadratic characteristic equation, which is greater than 1. Further, the threshold levels are 
related by:     1
1 1
1
ˆ ˆ ,
1
V K




            (8) 
with   11
1
1 1 1 1A
 
  . 
1.2 Two-Stage Model 
At the preceding stage, 2J  ,  the firm examines the viability of committing an investment 2K  
to acquire the option to invest 
1F  by comparing the value of the compound option 2 2ROV F  
with the net benefits 
1 2F K .  2F  depends on the three factors 2V , 1K  and 2K , so 
 2 2 2 1 2, ,F F V K K . By Ito’s lemma, the risk neutral valuation relationship for 2F  is: 
 
2 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 1
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 22 2 21 1 1
2 1 22 2 22 2 2
2 1 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
, 2 1 , 2 2 , 1 2
2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 2
2 2 1 2
2 2 1
0.
V K K
V K V K V K V K K K K K
V K K
F F F
V K K
V K K
F F F
V K V K K K
V K V K K K
F F F
V K K rF
V K K
  
        
  
  
 
  
  
  
     
  
    
  
 (9) 
We conjecture that the solution to (9) is a product power function, with generic form: 
 2 21 222 2 2 1 2 ,F A V K K
    (10) 
where 2 , 21  and 22  denote the generic unknown parameters for the three factors, project 
value at stage two and investment expenditures envisioned as of stage two, and 2A  denotes an 
unknown coefficient. It is similarly expected that 2 0A  . We conjecture that 2 0   because 
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project value increases incentivize the option exercise, while 
21 22, 0    because investment cost 
increases inhibit the option exercise.  
 
We specify that the stage-2 threshold levels signaling an optimal exercise are represented by 
2Vˆ , 
21Kˆ  and 22Kˆ  for V , 1K  and 2K , respectively. The set  2 21 22ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,V K K  forms the boundary that 
discriminates between the “exercise” decision and the “wait” decision. This boundary is 
determined from establishing the relationship amongst
2Vˆ , 21Kˆ  and 22Kˆ  , or alternatively, from 
identifying the dependence of 
2Vˆ  with respect to 21Kˆ  and 22Kˆ . A stage-2 option exercise occurs 
for the balance between the stage-2 option value 2 21 22
2 2 21 22
ˆ ˆ ˆA V K K    and the stage-1 option value 
1 11
1 1 11
ˆ ˆAV K   less the investment cost 22Kˆ incurred in its acquisition. This equilibrium amongst the 
threshold levels is the value matching relation that is expressed as: 
 2 21 22 1 11
2 2 21 22 1 2 21 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,A V K K AV K K       (11) 
where 
1A  and 1  are known from the stage-1 evaluation . The three smooth pasting conditions 
associated with (11), one for each of the three factors V , 1K  and 2K , respectively, can be 
expressed as:     2 21 22 1 11
2 2 2 21 22 1 1 2 21
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,A V K K AV K                (12) 
  2 21 22 1 1121 2 2 21 22 1 1 2 21ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 ,A V K K AV K
         (13) 
 2 21 22
22 2 2 21 22 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .A V K K K      (14) 
Since an option value is non-negative, then 2 0A   as expected. This implies that 2 0   from 
(12), 21 0   from (13), and 22 0   from (14).  If we specify 1 1   and 2 2 1/ 0    , then  
 2 122 21 2 2 21 22
1 1
1
1 , , 1.
 
     
 

        (15) 
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Also, the quadratic function 
2Q  can be expressed as: 
 
 
   
      
 
2 2 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
2
21
2 2 2 22
2 1
2 21
1 12
1
1 2
0.
K V V
V V V K V K V K V K
K
Q
r
r
  
    
         

 
   
     
 
  
  (16) 
where  
 
 
   
2 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2
22 2 2 2 2
2 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
2 1 2 2 1
V K K
V K V K V K V K K K K K .
     
            
   
    
  (17) 
The parameter 
2 , which is required to be greater than one, is evaluated as the positive root of 
the quadratic function
2Q  (16), knowing 1 1   from the previously calculated stage-1 solution. 
The values of 
2 , 21  and 22 are then obtained from 2  and  1 . Subsequently, we show that 
2 1  , so 2 1  .  
 
Because of  (15), 
2A , 2Vˆ , 21Kˆ  and 22Kˆ  can be determined more conveniently by expressing 2F , 
(10), as a function of the stage-1 option value 1F , (3), and the stage-2 investment cost 2K , and 
noting that 2F  is characterized as homogenous degree-1: 
    
22
2 1 11 21 1
2 22 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2, , ,F F F K B F V K K B AV K K
               (18) 
where 22 2 1B A A
 . If the optimal stage-2 thresholds are,  12 1 2 21ˆ ˆ ˆF F V ,K for the stage-1 option, 
and 
22Kˆ , then the stage-2 value matching relationship (11). 
 2 21
2 12 22 12 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .B F K F K      (19) 
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Except for the change in variable, (19) is identical in form to (4), so  
 2 21
2 2 21 /B
  

  , which 
implies: 
 
 
 
 
2
2 1
2 1
1 1
2 1
2
2 1
1 1
A
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
,  
so the stage-2 option value is specified by: 
  
 
 
   
2
2 1
1 21 2 2
2 1
1 1
12 1 1
2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 1
1 1
, ,F V K K V K K
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 . (20) 
The stage-2 option value function is homogenous degree-1 in the project value and investment 
costs. Also, the stage-2 option threshold level is given by: 
   1 11 212 1 2 12 1 2 21 22
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,
1
F F V K AV K K
  

  

 . (21) 
Clearly, an economically meaningful solution to the stage-2 option threshold can only emerge 
provided 2 1  . Re-arranging (21) to yield the solution expressed in terms of the stage-2 project 
value threshold level: 
 
  11
1 1
1
1 1
2 11
2 21 22
1 2
1ˆ ˆ ˆ .
1 1
V K K


  
 

 
  
  
  (22) 
The project value threshold is a homogenous degree-1 function of the two investment cost 
thresholds, determined from their geometric mean with the  21 22
ˆ ˆ,K K power parameters dependent 
only on the stage-1 1 . The relative magnitude of 1Vˆ  and 2Vˆ  is determined from comparing (8) 
and (22): 
 
  1
1
2 12 2
21 1
ˆ ˆ1
ˆ ˆ1
V K
V K
 

  
  
  
  (23) 
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where 
1 11 12
ˆ ˆ ˆK K K   and 2 22
ˆ ˆK K . Since 1 1  , then for stage-2 investment to be justified 
earlier than stage-1 investment, 
2 1
ˆ ˆV V , the following lower bound LB  must hold: 
 
 2 11
22
ˆ 1
1
ˆ 1
K
K
 


 

 . (24) 
The sequential investment model  of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Chapter 10, is based on identical 
stage-1 and -2 parameter values. It yields identical project value thresholds justifying immediate 
investment for the two sequential stages, so the two sequential stages effectively collapse to a 
single stage. For the current model, their assumption implies that all the stage-1 and -2 risk-
neutral drifts, volatilities and correlations are equal, or 
2 1V V
  , 
2 1
2 2
V V   and 2 1 1 1V K V K  . 
Substituting this in (16) yields 
2 1  , which produces an indefinite solution for the two-stage 
model. A meaningful economic solution also requires (24) to hold. This lower bound depends on 
the parameter values for the relevant stochastic factors at the two stages, the package of relative 
V1, V2 drifts and volatilities, K1, K2 drifts and volatilities, the covariance matrix, and the risk-free 
rate.  We conjecture that possibly 
1 2
ˆ ˆV V  if 
2 1V V
  , 
2 1
2 2
V V  , 2 1 1 1V K V K  .  There may be 
several other differentials that also result in 
1 2
ˆ ˆV V , see the Appendix 2, also for an easy 
analytical solution. Note that 
2Vˆ  is dependent on both 1Kˆ  and 2Kˆ , (22), whereas 1Vˆ  is dependent 
on only
1Kˆ ,(8). 
3.  Numerical Illustrations 
To obtain additional insights into the behavior of the analytical framework, we conduct some 
numerical analyses on a two stage sequential investment project using the base case specification  
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in Table 1, which  shows the standard input required, with  
1 2
.02, 0V V   . Note a spreadsheet 
for the calculations is shown in Appendix 1. 
 
Initially, the variances for the investment costs at the stages have been set to be equal and in the 
base case, the covariance terms between all of the factors equal zero. Some of these covariance 
terms are changed for the correlation sensitivity analysis.  The sensitivity analyses show the 
impact of parametric changes on the option value and the exercise threshold for the two stages. A 
change in parameter value yields a corresponding variation in the lower bound conditions JLB , 
which affects the option moneyness and the relative project value thresholds for the various 
stages. For consistent comparisons to be made across the various sensitivity analyses, first the 
magnitudes of the project value and the stage investment costs should result in the option values 
all being out-of-the money. To this end, all the analyses set the project value 40V  , and the  
 
  
      
 
Table 1 
         Base Case Data 
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Stage 1 model 
1Vˆ  is the solution for equations 7 and 8, ROV1 is the result from equation 3, with 
the base data in Table 1.  Stage 2 model 
2Vˆ  is the solution using equations 11-17, (or 16 and 22), 
ROV2 is the result from equation 10.  Note  
1 2
.02, 0V V   .  This drift differential results in 
1 2
ˆ ˆV V  and ROV1>ROV2.  The restrictive lower bound LB is 2.9 which is exceeded by the ratio 
of 1 2
ˆ ˆ/K K , equation 24. 
 
 
stage investment costs 1 90K  and 2 10K  . There is the requirement that the magnitudes of the 
stage investment cost threshold levels should result in the project value thresholds forming an 
ordered set with 
1 2
ˆ ˆV V , which entails that the ratios of the consecutive investment cost 
thresholds obey the lower bound condition. For convenience, we set the threshold investment 
costs equal to their actual expected levels.   
 
INPUT Stage 1 Stage 2
Project value   V 40 V^ 216.7596 111.8724
ROV 7.0466 3.0136
Risk-free rate 6%  1.7100 1.3236
Stage 1 LB 2.9043
_V1 0.02 Correlations V1 K1 K2
_V1 20% V1 100%
_K1 0 K1 0% 100%
_K1 5% K2 0% 0% 100%
Stage 2
_V2 0 Correlations V2 K1 K2
_V2 20% V2 100%
_K2 0 K1 0% 100%
_K2 5% K2 0% 0% 100%
Threshold Levels Factor Levels
K1^/K2^ 9.0000 K1^ 90 K1 90
 K2^ 10 K2 10
18 
 
We first consider the results for the base case, and then explore the impact of key sensitivities on 
the model solution. We comment on the results from the viewpoint of the Chief Real Options 
Manager (CROM) who seeks a high ROV, and then from the viewpoint of a government (GOV) 
which seeks low V thresholds in order to encourage early investment.  We also offer some 
guidelines for investors (INVEST) who believe that ROV implied by available stock market 
prices are different from evaluated ROV, based on investors particular expected volatilities and 
other parameter values.  
 
Table 2 is designed to show how a change in one parameter value like 
1V
 affects the V thresholds 
and the ROV at each stage.  We compare Panels B1 and C1 to A1 (the effect of changing one 
parameter value), and B2 to B1, C2 to C1 (the effect of increasing one parameter value, also 
shown in the Figures). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary:  Differential Results 
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Stage 1 model 
1Vˆ  is the solution for equations 7 and 8, ROV1 is the result from equation 
3, with the base data in Table 1.  Stage 2 model 
2Vˆ  is the solution using equations 11-17, 
ROV2 is the result from equation 10.  Note 
1 2
.02, 0V V   , except for Panel A2. 
 
3.1  Real Option Value and V Thresholds for
1 2V V
   
 
In Panel A1 all parameter values are as in Table 1, but in Panel A2  
1V
 is increased from .02 to 
.04. As a consequence the threshold that justifies immediate investment increases from 217 to 
394 in stage 1, but decreases from 112 to 54 in stage 2.  The ROV increases for both stages, from 
7 to 16 in stage 1 and from 3 to 7 in stage 2.  So just a difference in V drifts between the stages 
results in higher thresholds for the final stage 1, but lower for the initial stage 2 (as the final stage 
is more valuable, waiting for the V1 escalation to proceed).   The greater the drift difference, the 
Table 2
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Panel A1 Panel A2
_V1 0.02 _V1 0.04
V^ 216.7596 111.8724 V^ 393.9406 54.4155
ROV 7.0466 3.0136 ROV 15.6773 6.6525
 1.7100 1.3236  1.2961 1.7484
Panel B1 _V1 0.02 Panel B2 _V1 0.02
_V1 30% _V1 40%
V^ 286.6809 75.3040 V^ 375.4515 56.8412
ROV 11.1436 4.2966 ROV 15.0114 6.2374
 1.4576 1.5549  1.3153 1.7230
  
Panel C1 _V1 0.02 Panel C2 _V1 0.02
_V1K1 -50% _V1K1 -75%
_V2K1 50% _V2K1 50%
V^ 231.6018 91.5822 V^ 238.8103 87.9894
ROV 8.0101 2.8528 ROV 8.4591 2.9922
 1.6356 1.4351  1.6048 1.5006
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greater this effect.  The CROM ought to favour greater drift differences with 
1 2V V
  , since the 
ROV increase. GOV should welcome increases in the V1 drift only if the objective is to motivate 
early initial, but not final, stage investments. 
 
Figure 1 shows a stage specific divergence between the stage thresholds, and the stage ROVs.  
There is a dramatic divergence between the stage thresholds as the V1 drift approaches the 
riskless interest rate, while the V2 drift remains 0, and a gradual divergence between the ROVs 
for each stage.   
 
The implications of these divergences are problematic in practice. For instance, a procedure 
where the allowed toll rate escalations on a infrastructure project such as a toll road or bridge are 
increased as the project approaches completion should lower the threshold for initial stages 
(although raises the threshold for the final stage, allowing for V1 escalation to continue). 
Whether these V1 drifts are exogenous or subject to government policy is also another interesting 
topic.  We emphasise again that the CROM should always favour increases in value drift at all 
stages, especially at the completion stage.  This is an obvious contribution to our understanding 
of growth options.    
Figure 1 
Effect of Drift Differentiation on Thresholds and ROV 
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Stage 1 model 
1Vˆ  is the solution for equations 7 and 8, ROV1 is the result from equation 3, with 
the base data in Table 1.  Stage 2 model 
2Vˆ  is the solution using equations 11-17, ROV2 is the 
result from equation 10.  Note 
2 1
0,V V   range from 1% to 4.5%, so these drift differentials 
result in 
1 2
ˆ ˆV V  , and ROV1>ROV2.   
 
V1 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5%
V1* 183.19 197.94 216.76 241.41 274.80 322.16 393.94 514.53
V2* 166.36 134.18 111.87 94.21 79.25 66.12 54.42 43.93
ROV1 4.68 5.75 7.05 8.62 10.52 12.84 15.68 19.20
ROV2 2.68 2.78 3.01 3.42 4.05 5.05 6.65 9.31
0
100
200
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400
500
600
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3.2 Real Option Value and Thresholds for V1> V2 
For the single stage investment opportunity model, an increase in volatility is associated with 
increases in the option value and the project value threshold, ceteris paribus. We now set out to 
demonstrate whether this finding extends to the current multi-stage sequential investment model. 
We first consider the impact of project volatility changes. Generally an increase in project 
volatility 
1V
  leads to an increase in the overall stage volatility 
J  and this greater uncertainty is 
expected to be manifested in higher option values. When we consider the impact of stage specific 
project value volatility on the project value threshold at each stage, the expected result of a 
positive association is obtained.   
 
In Table 2, Panel B1 all parameter values are as in Table 1 with 
1
.02V  (for comparison with 
Panel A1) while
1V
 is increased from 20% to 30%, and to 40% in Panel B2.  As a consequence of 
the first volatility increase the threshold that justifies immediate investment increases from 217 
to 287 in stage 1, but decreases from 112 to 75 in stage 2.  With the additional volatility increase 
the threshold increases to 375 in stage 1, but decreases to 57 in stage 2.  The stage 1 ROV1 
increases as the 
1V
 increases from 20% to 30%, and the stage 2 ROV2 increases.    The stage 1 
ROV1 increases as the 
1V
 increases from 30% to 40%, and the stage 2 ROV1 increases. The 
greater the V1 volatility, the greater the ROV1, so the V2 threshold to obtain the option for stage 1 
is lower, but the threshold for exercising the stage 1 option is higher.     
 
Figure 2 shows when the final stage value volatility exceeds the previous stage value volatility, 
for instance  
1V
 =30% while 
2V
 remains at 20%, the V1 threshold exceeds the V2 threshold, and 
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the ROV1>ROV2. As the final stage value volatility increases, this pattern is maintained, but the 
level of both ROV increase, while the stage 1 and stage 2 threshold differences increase. Note  
1Vˆ  increases significantly as V1 volatility increases as is logical and the ROV1 increases, and 2Vˆ  
declines.  From the value matching condition, 
2Vˆ  declines due to the ROV1 increase at each 
stage.     
 
Because thresholds that justify investment diverge as the V1 volatility increases, there is a greater 
incentive to make the initial stage investment, but defer the final stage investment.  GOV policy 
may be ambiguous thus on the V1 volatility, if project completion is the objective. A GOV which 
wants to encourage early stage investments might allow the expectation of high value volatility, 
but after that stage investment is completed, encourage final stage investment by offering price 
guarantees for the project value, which would lower the final stage value threshold.  The CROM 
should favour increases in the V1 volatility, since the ROV increases at all levels. But should the 
CROM seek to sell the project for the calculated ROV, there is apparently a greater incentive to 
defer selling the project until the final stage is reached.  It is easy to see that INVEST may want 
to invest in early stage 2 projects if the implied stock market
3
 V1 volatility is 25% (for a 
ROV2=3.56, if 
2V
 =20%) if they believe the V1 volatility is 40% (for a ROV2=6.24) (and hold 
through stage 1 when the ROV1=15.01). 
 
Figure 2   
                                                 
3
 This assumes there are pure simple sequential investment opportunities in the stock market, not mixed with other 
operations, and that separate parameter values can be implied using a complex model.  Currently accurate 
calibration of these parameter values is a challenge. 
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Effect of V Volatility Differentiation on Thresholds and ROV 
 
V1 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55%
V1* 216.76 249.41 286.68 328.66 375.45 427.18 483.96 545.87
V2* 111.87 89.95 75.30 64.75 56.84 50.75 45.96 42.14
ROV1 7.05 9.10 11.14 13.13 15.01 16.78 18.42 19.94
ROV2 3.01 3.56 4.30 5.20 6.24 7.40 8.65 9.97
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Stage 1 model 
1Vˆ  is the solution for equations 7 and 8, ROV1 is the result from equation 3, with 
the base data in Table 1.  Stage 2 model 
2Vˆ  is the solution using equations 11-17, ROV2 is the 
result from equation 10.    Note if 
2V
 = 20%, while 
1V
 is higher at 25% to 55%, these volatility 
differentials also result in 
1 2
ˆ ˆV V , and ROV1>ROV2.  
3.3 Correlation 
Changes in the correlation coefficients impact on the solution through the relevant stage 
volatilities, 
J  for 1 2J , , which in turn influence the option values and the project value 
thresholds.  We had conjectured that the relative correlation between V1K1 relative to V2K1 
might be an alternative parameter value difference that could result in increasing thresholds 
nearing the final stage, but the implications for ROV appear to be limited. 
 
For the two stages, Table 2 illustrates the effects of variations in the correlation between the 
project value and the investment cost K1 on the option value and the project value threshold, 
respectively. In Table 2 Panel C1 all parameter values are as in Table 1 with 
1V
 =.02, 
2 1V K
 is 
increased from 0 to 50%, and 
1 1V K
 is decreased from 0 to -50% in Panel C1, and to -75% in 
Panel C2.  As a consequence of the first set of correlation changes the threshold that justifies 
immediate investment increases from 217 to 232 in stage 1, but decreases from 112 to 92 in stage 
2.  In comparison with C1, in C2 with 
1 1V K
 = -75%, the threshold increases to 239 in stage 1, but 
decreases to 88 in stage 2.  The ROV1 increases with the first set of correlation changes, and the 
ROV2 decreases slightly, and in C2 the ROVs increase slightly.  A wider correlation difference 
between V1K1 and V2K1 has the same effect as an increase in V1 volatility. The greater the 
correlation difference, the greater the ROV1, so the V threshold to obtain the option for stage 1 is 
lower, but the threshold for exercising the stage 1 option is higher.     
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Figure 3 
Effect of Correlation Differentiation on Thresholds and ROV 
   
V1K1 -50% -55% -60% -65% -70% -75% -80% -85%
V1* 231.60 233.05 234.50 235.94 237.38 238.81 240.24 241.66
V2* 91.58 90.83 90.09 89.37 88.67 87.99 87.32 86.67
ROV1 8.01 8.10 8.19 8.28 8.37 8.46 8.55 8.63
ROV2 2.85 2.88 2.91 2.94 2.96 2.99 3.02 3.05
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Stage 1 model 
1Vˆ  is the solution for equations 7 and 8, ROV1 is the result from equation 3, with 
the base data in Table 1.  Stage 2 model 
2Vˆ  is the solution using equations 11-17, ROV2 is the 
result from equation 10.  Note that if 
2 1V K
 = 50%, while 
1 1V K
 ranges from -50% to -85%, these 
correlation differentials also result in 
1 2
ˆ ˆV V , and ROV1>ROV2.  
 
GOV seeking early stage investment would encourage negative correlations at the final stage, but 
the result would be to slightly discourage investment at that final stage.  The CROM would 
probably seek no correlation differences between V1K1 and V2K1 (indeed 
1 1V K
 >0 implies that 
the early stage value is somehow positively related to the final stage investment costs).  
Conceivably the V1K1 and V2K1 correlation differentials might be established through contracts 
for basing the final stage investment costs partially on the early stage project value, that is the 
greater the earlier stage value, the greater the final stage investment cost, an “afford to pay” 
scheme.  Could negative correlation between final stage project value and final stage investment 
cost be a feasible type of milestone agreement between an early stage E&D firm and a Big 
Mining firm, that is the investment cost for final production stage would be reduced the higher 
the final stage project value?  
 
Other parameter value changes that might also result in solutions that do not violate the stage 
investment cost boundary conditions, so that threshold increase as the project approaches 
completion, might be changes in stage 2 V volatility, differential investment cost drifts and 
volatilities, and changes in the general level of interest rates, as shown in Appendix 2.  
 
Discussing these sensitivities indicates that changes in all of the parameter values should be 
considered in a package which meets the objectives of the regulator or government, or 
alternatively the project manager. Incentives are not always intuitive. 
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Are differences in V drifts, or correlation differences between V1K1 and V2K1, or volatility for 
V1 higher than for V2 plausible?  Cortazar et al. (2003) divide natural resource investments into 
early and final stages.  The early exploration stage involves primarily geological-technical 
uncertainty following a zero-drift constant volatility Brownian motion process, independent of 
output prices.  The final production stage involves primarily commodity price risk following a 
constant-convenience-yield Brownian motion process.  So  
1 2
0V V   , the correlation with the 
investment cost over the two stages is not specified, and the V1 volatility is greater than the V2 
volatility.  In natural gas fracking in the U.S., there is evidence that the exploration-development 
stage has very limited failure risk or volatility (very few “dry holes”), while the production stage 
is exposed to the highly volatile U.S. natural gas prices, with a distinct convenience yield 
observable from the term structure of gas futures prices.   
 
Conclusion 
We provide an analytical solution for a multi-factor, multi-phase sequential investment process, 
where there is the real option of deferring investments at any stage.  This model is particularly 
appropriate for real sequential E&D investment opportunities, such as infrastructure or  natural 
resources that may have an initial  development and then a final production investment stage.   
 
Decisions relating to the sequential investment opportunity are affected by three distinct sources 
of stage specific uncertainty, arising from a stochastic project value, stochastic investment costs 
and correlations of value and cost.  Amongst the three sources of uncertainty, the most crucial for 
obtaining a meaningful solution with differences in stage 1 and stage 2 thresholds are the relative 
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value drifts and volatilities.  The primary condition in Adkins and Paxson (2014) that the failure 
probabilities for the various stages have to obey the constraint of declining nearing completion is 
not necessary, although sufficient.  However, there is still the constraint that the ratio of 
consecutive investment cost thresholds exceeds the lower bound 
JLB . 
 
The closed-form solution to the multi-stage sequential investment opportunity is formulated on 
American-perpetuity options. It yields an analytical solution that is straightforward conceptually 
and less onerous to evaluate compared with some previous models. However, its solution now 
relies on a package of conditions, with a menu that is rich and varied.  Some real world projects 
may allow for  these conditions, but necessarily not all. For the exceptions, the conditions will 
need to be loosened in some way, possibly by a mixture of European and American options or 
through the presence of an abandonment alternative at each stage. 
 
The American-perpetuity option model applied to the parsimonious design of a sequential 
investment opportunity yields an elegant analytical solution that can be implemented in a simple 
spreadsheet, useful for practical capital budgeting. The solution method may be extendable to 
cases where the realized opportunity has embedded options, where there is a required time to 
build, where there is more than a single project opportunity, where there are several stages, or 
where the value can be partially realized at each stage. The assumption of a monopolist player 
can be loosened by considering the comparative strategies of say two rivals both engaged in the 
same E&D  or infrastructure battle.  
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For future research it will be interesting to show analytically the partial derivatives of the ROV at 
each stage to changes in V, V volatility (real stage specific deltas and vegas) and drift, and 
failure probability, some of which are indicated in Appendix 2.  An investor seeking “bang for 
the buck” expecting increases in stage value volatility might want to select an investment in an 
early stage rather a final stage.  Various  capital funds investing in E&D may indicate a 
preference for early stage participation, others (like Big Mining Companies) in later stages.   
 
Finally, the multi-stage American-perpetuity model could be applied to valuing equity as a 
compound call option on an asset unlikely to disappear or fail completely either partly funded by 
debt or itself with embedded options. 
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Appendix 1      Spreadsheet Solution for a Set of Equations 
For 1J  , the two-factor one-stage investment model is evaluated , assuming 
1Kˆ =K1. Then 
according to the sequential order 2J  , the model is evaluated by solving simultaneously five 
equations for five unknowns, assuming that 
1Kˆ =K1, 2Kˆ =K2and 22=1-2-21.   
 
 This spreadsheet is available from the authors. 
  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
A B C D E
SSRD BASIC SPREADSHEET
INPUT STAGE ONE STAGE TWO
V 40.00 40.00
K1 90.00 90.00
K2 10.00 10.00
V1 0.20 0.20
V2  0.20
K1 0.05 0.05
K2  0.05
 V1K1 0.00 0.00
 V1K2   
 V2K1  0.00
 V2K2  0.00
 K1K2  0.00
r 0.06 0.06
V1 0.02 0.02
V2  0.00
K1 0.00 0.00
K2  0.00
   
OUTPUT   
^2 0.0425 0.1207 (B31^2)*(C7^2)+((1-B31)^2)*(C8^2)+(C9^2)+2*B31*(1-B31)*C12*C6*C8-2*B31*C13*C6*C9-2*(1-B31)*C14*C8*C9 EQ 17
Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.5*(C22)*C38*(C38-1)+C38*((C15-C19)+B38*(C17-C16)+0.5*B38*(B38-1)*((C7^2-C6^2)-2*(C12*C7*C9-C10*C6*C8)))-(C15-C19) EQ 7 & 16
SP1 0.0000 0.0000 C31*C30*(C33^(C31))*(C35^C32)*(C36^C34)-B31*B30*(C33^(B31))*(C35^(1-B31)) EQ 5 & 12
SP2 0.0000 0.0000 C32*C30*(C33^C31)*(C35^(C32-1))*(C36^C34)-(1-B31)*B30*(C33^B31)*(C35^(-B31)) EQ 6 & 13
VM1/SP3 0.0000 0.0000 C34*C30*(C33^C31)*(C35^C32)*(C36^(C34-1))+1 EQ 14
B23B24/VM2 0.0000 0.0000 C30*(C33^C31)*(C35^C32)*(C36^C34)-B30*(C33^B31)*(C35^(1-B31))+C36 EQ 4 & 11
SOLVER: SET D29=0, CHANGING B30:C33
SOLVER 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000
A2 0.3133 0.1031
2 1.7100 2.2633
21 -0.7100 -0.9397
V1* 216.7596 111.8724
22  -0.3236 1-C31-C32
K1* 90.0000 90.0000
K2*  10.0000
VOLATILITY 0.2062 0.3475
1 2 1.7100 1.3236 C31/B38
ROV1, ROV2 7.0466 3.0136 IF(C3<C33,C30*(C3^C31)*(C4^C32)*(C5^C34),C33-C35) EQ 3 & 10
PDE2, PDE9 0.0000 0.0000 EQ 2 & 9
DV1 0.3012  B31*B30*(B3^(B31-1))*(B4^B32)
DV2 0.1705 C31*C30*(C3^(C31-1))*(C4^C32)*(C5^C34)
DK1 -0.0556 -0.0315 C32*C30*(C3^C31)*(C4^(C32-1))*(C5^C34)
DK2 -0.0975 C34*C30*(C3^C31)*(C4^C32)*(C5^(C34-1))
GV1 0.0053  B31*(B31-1)*B30*(B3^(B31-2))*(B4^B32)
GV2 0.0054 C31*(C31-1)*C30*(C3^(C31-2))*(C4^C32)
GK1 0.0011 0.0007 C32*(C32-1)*C30*(C3^C31)*(C4^(C32-2))*(C5^C34)
GK2 0.0129 C34*(C34-1)*C30*(C3^C31)*(C4^C32)*(C5^(C34-2))
PDE 2 0.5*(B6^2)*(B3^2)*B45+0.5*(B8^2)*(B4^2)*B47+B16*B3*B41+B18*B4*B43-B15*B39
PDE 9 0.5*(C7^2)*(C3^2)*C46+0.5*(C8^2)*(C4^2)*C47+0.5*(C9^2)*(C5^2)*C48+C17*C3*C42+C18*C4*C43+C19*C5*C44-C15*C39
V2* 111.8724 (B38/(B38-1))*(((C38*(B38-1)/(C38-1))^(1/B38))*(C35^((B38-1)/B38)))*((C36^(1/B38))) EQ 22
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Appendix 2    An Easy Quadratic Solution and Some Additional Sensitivities  
The 
1Q   function (7) is a quadratic expressed as: 
 
       
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1 1 1
1 1 1
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with the solution 
2 4
2
b b ac
a
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where a, b and c are    
1 1 1
1 2
21
1
2
2
1, ,V K Kr          (A2A) 
The 
2Q   function (16) is a quadratic expressed as: 
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Now specify: 
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and                      
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The coefficients for this quadratic are: 
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An Alternative Quadratic Solution for Thresholds and ROV  
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
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38
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48
49
50
51
52
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54
55
56
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58
A B C D
Quadratic Solution
INPUT STAGE ONE EQ
V 40.00
K1 90.00
K2  
V1 0.20
V2  
K1 0.05
K2  
 V1K1 0.00
 V2K1  
 V2K2  
 K1K2  
r 0.06
V1 0.02
V2  
K1 0.00
K2  
STAGE TWO
V 40.00
K1 90.00
K2 10.00
V1 0.20
V2 0.20
K1 0.05
K2 0.05
 V1K1 0.00
 V2K1 0.00
 V2K2 0.00
 K1K2 0.00
r 0.06
V1 0.02
V2 0.00
K1 0.00
K2 0.00
OUTPUT  
^2 0.0425 B6^2+B8^2-2*B10*B6*B8 7A
b1 -0.0013 B15-B17-0.5*B37 A2A
1 1.7100 (-B38+SQRT((B38^2)-4*0.5*B37*-(B14-B17)))/(2*0.5*B37) A2
A1 0.3133 (B39^(-B39))*((B39-1)^(B39-1)) 8A
V1* 216.7596 (B39/(B39-1))*B4 8
K1* 90.0000  
K2*   
2
21 -0.7100 1-B39  
ROV1 7.0466 IF(B3<B41,B40*(B3^B39)*(B4^B45),B41-B42) 3
^2 0.1207 (B39^2)*(B24^2)+((1-B39)^2)*(B25^2)+(B26^2)+2*B39*(1-B39)*B28*B24*B25-2*B39*B29*B24*B26-2*(1-B39)*B30*B25*B26 17
21^2 0.0425 B24^2+B25^2-2*B28*B24*B25 A4A
b2 -0.0346 ((-B35)+B39*B33+0.5*B39*(B39-1)*B48-0.5*B47) A6
2 1.3236 (-B49+SQRT((B49^2)-4*0.5*B47*-(B31-B35)))/(2*0.5*B47) A2
A2 0.1031 (((B50-1)^(B50-1))/(B50^B50))*(((B39-1)^(B39-1))/(B39^B39))^B50 19A
V2* 111.8724 (B39/(B39-1))*(((B50*(B39-1)/(B50-1))^(1/B39))*(B53^((B39-1)/B39)))*((B54^(1/B39))) 22
K1* 90.0000  
K2* 10.0000  
2 2.2633 B50*B39
21 -0.9397 (1-B39)*B55/B39
22 -0.3236 1-B55-B56
ROV2 3.0136 IF(B20<B52,B51*(B20^B55)*(B21^B56)*(B22^B57),B52-B54) 10
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
A B C D
PDE1 0.0000 0.5*(B6^2)*(B3^2)*B64+0.5*(B8^2)*(B4^2)*B66+B15*B3*B60+B17*B4*B62-B14*B47 2
DV1 0.3012 B39*B40*(B3^(B39-1))*(B4^B45)
DV2
DK1 -0.0556 B45*B40*(B3^B39)*(B4^(B45-1))
DK2
GV1 0.0053 B39*(B39-1)*B40*(B3^(B39-2))*(B4^B45)
GV2
GK1 0.0011 B45*(B45-1)*B40*(B3^B39)*(B4^(B45-2))
GK2
PDE2 0.0000 0.5*(B24^2)*(B20^2)*B74+0.5*(B25^2)*(B21^2)*B75+0.5*(B26^2)*(B22^2)*B76+B33*B20*B70+B34*B21*B71+B35*B22*B72-B31*B58 9
DV1   
DV2 0.1705 B55*B51*(B20^(B55-1))*(B21^B56)*(B22^B57)
DK1 -0.0315 B56*B51*(B20^B55)*(B21^(B56-1))*(B22^B57)
DK2 -0.0975 B57*B51*(B20^B55)*(B21^B56)*(B22^(B57-1))
GV1   
GV2 0.0054 B55*(B55-1)*B51*(B20^(B55-2))*(B21^B56)*(B22^B57)
GK1 0.0007 B56*(B56-1)*B51*(B20^B55)*(B21^(B56-2))*(B22^B57)
GK2 0.0129 B57*(B57-1)*B51*(B20^B55)*(B21^B56)*(B22^(B57-2))
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Figure A1 
  
1 2
ˆ ˆV V  decreases as
2V
  increases from 0 to 25% if 
1V
  remains at 20%, but beyond that the LB 
no longer holds, based on the Table 1 parameter values.   
 Figure A2 
V2 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
V1* 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76
V2* 54.89 59.66 70.03 85.82 111.87 166.82
ROV1 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05
ROV2 0.09 0.36 1.02 1.92 3.01 4.38
50
100
150
200
250
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
V2
V1 & V2 Thresholds as 
function of V2 Volatility
V1*
V2*
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
V2
Stage ROV as function of V2 Volatility
ROV1
ROV2
38 
 
1 2
ˆ ˆV V  decreases as r increases from 3% to 10%, but beyond that the LB no longer holds, based 
on the Table 1 parameter values.   
     Figure A3 
r 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
V1* 502.93 314.04 249.68 216.76 196.56 182.79 172.75 165.07
V2* 60.12 82.99 99.58 111.87 121.17 128.33 133.95 138.41
ROV1 18.91 12.47 9.11 7.05 5.65 4.65 3.90 3.33
ROV2 10.13 5.86 4.03 3.01 2.37 1.93 1.61 1.37
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1 2
ˆ ˆV V  decreases as K1 drift increases from 0 to almost 6%=r, but beyond that the LB no longer 
holds, based on the Table 1 parameter values.   
 Figure A4 
K1 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
V1* 216.76 199.58 183.72 169.46 157.02 146.49 137.81 130.79
V2* 111.87 116.75 121.79 126.75 131.30 135.14 138.05 139.98
ROV1 7.05 5.87 4.72 3.66 2.72 1.95 1.35 0.91
ROV2 3.01 2.38 1.81 1.32 0.93 0.63 0.42 0.27
LB 2.90 3.39 4.02 4.84 5.92 7.30 9.04 11.19
K1/K2 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
ViolateLB ViolateLB
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1 2
ˆ ˆV V  decreases as 
1K
  increases from 0 to 35% showing it pays to wait at stage 1if the final 
stage investment cost is increasingly volatile.   
Figure A5 
K1 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
V1* 212.94 216.76 227.95 245.90 270.00 299.78 334.98 375.45
V2* 112.56 111.87 109.88 106.79 102.92 98.62 94.18 89.83
ROV1 6.79 7.05 7.78 8.89 10.26 11.80 13.40 15.01
ROV2 2.86 3.01 3.46 4.16 5.06 6.11 7.24 8.42
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1 2
ˆ ˆV V  decreases as K2 increases because 2Vˆ  increases naturally and ROV2 decreases. 
K2* 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
V1* 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76
V2* 74.59 111.88 141.83 167.83 191.24 212.77 232.87 251.80
ROV1 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05
ROV2 3.77 3.01 2.64 2.41 2.24 2.11 2.01 1.93
LB 2.90 2.90 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91
K1/K2 18.00 9.00 6.00 4.50 3.60 3.00 2.57 2.25
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   Figure A6 
K1* 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00
V1* 72.25 96.34 120.42 144.51 168.59 192.68 216.76 240.84
V2* 70.90 79.90 87.66 94.56 100.82 106.58 111.93 116.94
ROV1 15.37 12.53 10.70 9.40 8.42 7.66 7.05 6.54
ROV2 8.46 6.46 5.24 4.41 3.82 3.37 3.02 2.73
LB 2.90 2.90 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91
K1/K2 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
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1 2
ˆ ˆV V  increases as K1 increases because 1Vˆ  increases naturally and both ROV decrease. 
Figure A7 
 
ROVs increase and the spread ROV1>ROV2 increases as V increases, following EQ 3 and 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 110.00
ROV1 0.00 0.66 2.15 4.31 7.05 10.32 14.10 18.35 23.05 28.20 33.76 39.74
ROV2 0.00 0.13 0.63 1.57 3.01 4.99 7.54 10.69 14.47 18.89 23.97 29.75
DV1 0.00 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.62
DV2 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.54 0.61
PDE1 #DIV/0! 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DV1 0.0000 0.1126 0.1842 0.2456 0.3012 0.3530 0.4017 0.4482 0.4928 0.5358 0.5774 0.6178
DV2
DK1 0.0000 -0.0052 -0.0170 -0.0340 -0.0556 -0.0814 -0.1112 -0.1447 -0.1819 -0.2224 -0.2664 -0.3135
DK2
GV1 #DIV/0! 0.0080 0.0065 0.0058 0.0053 0.0050 0.0048 0.0045 0.0044 0.0042 0.0041 0.0040
GV2
GK1 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011 0.0015 0.0021 0.0028 0.0035 0.0042 0.0051 0.0060
GK2
PDE2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DV1             
DV2 0.0000 0.0296 0.0710 0.1186 0.1705 0.2260 0.2846 0.3458 0.4093 0.4750 0.5426 0.6120
DK1 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0066 -0.0164 -0.0315 -0.0521 -0.0788 -0.1117 -0.1511 -0.1972 -0.2503 -0.3106
DK2 0.0000 -0.0042 -0.0203 -0.0508 -0.0975 -0.1616 -0.2441 -0.3460 -0.4682 -0.6112 -0.7758 -0.9625
GV1             
GV2 0.0000 0.0037 0.0045 0.0050 0.0054 0.0057 0.0060 0.0062 0.0065 0.0067 0.0069 0.0070
GK1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 0.0017 0.0024 0.0033 0.0043 0.0054 0.0067
GK2 0.0000 0.0006 0.0027 0.0067 0.0129 0.0214 0.0323 0.0458 0.0620 0.0809 0.1027 0.1274
DV1 0.0000 0.1126 0.1842 0.2456 0.3012 0.3530 0.4017 0.4482 0.4928 0.5358 0.5774 0.6178
DV2 0.0000 0.0296 0.0710 0.1186 0.1705 0.2260 0.2846 0.3458 0.4093 0.4750 0.5426 0.6120
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Figure A8 
    
 
The ROV deltas increase and the spread DROV1>DROV2  decreases as V1 volatility increases 
past 25% . 
 
 
`      
 
 
 
 
 
DV1 0.1847 0.2432 0.3012 0.3558 0.4061 0.4519 0.4936 0.5314 0.5658 0.5969
DV2 0.1606 0.1529 0.1705 0.2016 0.2434 0.2944 0.3534 0.4190 0.4899 0.5646
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Figure A9 
 
 
Changes in the correlation of V2 and K1, and K2 and K1 do not significantly affect 2Vˆ or ROV2.   
 
 V2K1 0% -10% -20% -30% -40% -50% -60% -70%
V1* 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76
V2* 111.87 114.54 117.36 120.35 123.52 126.90 130.51 134.38
ROV1 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05
ROV2 3.01 3.10 3.20 3.29 3.39 3.49 3.59 3.69
 K1K2 0% -10% -20% -30% -40% -50% -60% -70%
V1* 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76 216.76
V2* 111.87 111.78 111.69 111.59 111.50 111.41 111.31 111.22
ROV1 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05
ROV2 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.99 2.99
